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PEOPLE v. DOE: ALTERNATIVE MEANS OF
PROTECTING THE CHILD-PARENT RELATIONSHIP
Since 1776, a general rule of evidence has been that the state is entitled
to every man's testimony.' Occasionally, exceptions to that general rule
have been created. For example, testimonial privileges were created to
protect certain relationships.2 Also, constitutional protections render the
rule inapplicable in certain situations, for example, where application of
the rule would force a criminal defendant to be his own accusor.3 No such
exception has been available with respect to the relationship between child
and parent.' No testimonial privilege protects confidential communica-
tions between a child and his parent, and no constitutional right has been
extended to protect the relationship from the application of the general
rule.' Recently, however, a New York court ruled in People v. Doe6 that
parents subpoenaed by a grand jury do not have to disclose confidential
admissions made to them by their son.7 The court based its holding on a
constitutional right to familial privacy.
In Doe, the parents of a sixteen-year-old boy had been subpoenaed by
a grand jury investigating an arson. The grand jury suspected the boy of
involvement in the arson and sought to elicit ny admissions or inculpatory
statements made to the parents by their son.' The parents moved to quash
the subpoena. The trial court granted the motion on the basis of two
considerations. 0 First, the trial court held that confidential communica-
tions between parent and child are protected by the marital privilege."'
I United States v. Bryan, 339 U.S. 323, 331 (1950); Blackmer v. United States, 284 U.S.
421, 438 (1932); Hill's Trial, 20 How. St. Tr. 1362 (1777); Duchess of.Kingston's Case, 20 How.
St. Tr. 586 (1776). See also 8 J. WIoMOR, EVIDENCE, § 2286 n.16 (McNaughton rev. 1961)
[hereinafter cited as WIGMORE]; Hutchins & Slesinger, Some Observations on the Law
Evidence: Family Relations, 13 MiNN. L. Rxv. 675 (1929).
2 WIGMORE, supra note 1, at § 2285. The relationships protected were attorney-client,
priest-penitent, doctor-patient and husband-wife. Id.; see note 113 infra.
U.S. CONST. amend. v.
Coburn, Child-Parent Communications: Spare the Privilege and Spoil the Child, 74
DicK. L. Rav. 599, 615-20 (1970) [hereinafter cited as Coburn].
Note, The Fundamental Right to Family Integrity and Its Role in New York Foster
Care Adjudications, 44 BROOKLYN L. REv. 63 (1977) [hereinafter cited as Family Integrity].
' 61 App. Div.2d 426, 403 N.Y.S.2d 375 (1978). The name of the case includes the
psuedonym, "Doe," to protect the privacy of the respondent.
Id. at 435-36, 403 N.Y.S.2d at 382.
Id. at 433-34, 403 N.Y.S.2d at 381.
Id. at 428, 403 N.Y.S.2d at 377. The court noted in the opinion that the parents were
not at the scene of the fire and that they had no personal knowledge of the arson.
,0 Id. 403 N.Y.S.2d at 377.
Id. 403 N.Y.S.2d at 377. The marital privilege protects only confidential communica-
tions between partners to a valid marriage from forced disclosure, WIGMORE, supra note 1, at
§ 2335; Note, The Husband- Wife Privileges of Testimonial Non-Disclosure, 56 Nw. U. L. REv.
208, 218-20 (1961) [hereinafter cited as Husband-Wife Privileges], and is recognized in all
American jurisdictions. Note, Spousal Testimony, 28 BRooKLN L. REv. 259, 293-96 (1962)
[hereinafter cited as Spousal Testimony]. Moreover, if the communications are made within
the presence of a third party, including the married couple's minor child capable of under-
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Second, the trial court held that parent-child communications are pro-
tected by a constitutional right to familial privacy.' 2 On appeal to the New
York Supreme Court, '3 the decision of the trial court to quash the subpoena
was reversed.' 4 The court first rejected the conclusion of the trial court that
the marital privilege protected child-parent communications,'5 reasoning
that New York's statutory marital privilege protects only confidential com-
munications between parties to a valid marriage. Since the child's state-
ments were not communications between marital partners, they were not
within the scope of the marital privilege.' 6 The State Supreme Court
agreed, however, with the trial court's reasoning that the boy's admissions
were constitutionally protected.' 7 The court relied upon a line of cases in
which the United States Supreme Court recognized a realm of private
family life which the state cannot enter.'" This right to familial iiitegrity
stems from two separate considerations:'9 protection of the family as a
valuable institution in society2 and protection of the right of privacy in
standing the communications, then the communications are not confidential and are unpro-
tected. Id.; see Moser, Compellability of One Spouse to Testify Against the Other in Criminal
Cases, 15 MD. L. Rav. 16, 17-18 (1955) [hereinafter cited as Moser].
12 People v. Doe, 61 App. Div.2d 426, 428, 403 N.Y.S.2d 375, 377 (1978).
,1 The New York Supreme Court, Appellate Division, Fourth Department is an interme-
diate appellate court, not the highest court in the state.
" People v. Doe, 61 App.Div.2d 426, 436, 403 N.Y.S.2d 375, 381 (1978).
,5 Id. at 428-29, 403 N.Y.S.2d at 377.
" Id. In addition to the fact that the child obviously is not a partner to the marriage,
his presence during the communication also denies confidentiality. See note 11 supra. The
court noted that there were, thus, two grounds for finding that the boy's statements were not
protected by the marital privilege. The court also dealt with the respondent's claim that the
attorney-client privilege applied to the boy's statements. 61 App.Div.2d at 429, 403 N.Y.S.2d
at 377-78. That privilege applies only when someone seeks legal advice from a lawyer and, in
doing so, confidentially reveals to the lawyer information related to the problem involved.
WIGMORE, supra note 1, at § 2290-2292; Note, The Lawyer-Client Privilege: Its Application
to Corporations, the Role of Ethics, and Its Possible Curtailment, 56 Nw. U. L. Rxv. 235, 236
(1961); see note 113 infra. In Doe, although the boy's father was an attorney, the communica-
tions were addressed to his father in his capacity as parent rather than as attorney. 61
App.Div.2d at 429, 403 N.Y.S.2d at 377-78.
,? Id. at 433-34, 403 N.Y.S.2d at 378.
' See, e.g., Cleveland Bd. of Educ. v. LaFleur, 414 U.S. 632, 639-40 (1974) (the due
process clause of the fourteenth amendment protects the decision to work while pregnant);
Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 152-53 (1973) (the concept of ordered liberty protected by the
fourteenth amendment includes the decision whether to have an abortion); Griswold v. Con-
necticut, 381 U.S. 479, 484-85 (1965) (the penumbra of the Bills of Rights creates zones of
privacy protecting the decision to use contraceptives); Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158,
166 (1944) (the due process clause protects the parents' right to raise their children as they
choose); Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510, 535 (1925) (the right of parents to raise
their children is within the concept of ordered liberty); Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 399
(1923) (the liberty which includes the right to control the education of one's children is
protected by the dtse process clause). See also Nelson, Domestic Tranquility and the Right
to Privacy: Is There a Right to Privacy Within the Family?, 18 S. TEx. L. J. 121 (1977);
Family Integrity, supra note 5.
" Family Integrity, supra note 5, at 64-65.
2* See Moore v. City of E. Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494 (1977) (the Constitution protects




The court, after establishing the existence of constitutional protection
of family relationships, admitted that the state may impose regulations
upon such relationships, but only when the state has a legitimate interest
which justifies abridging the integrity of the family.2 In deciding whether
the state in this particular case could require the parents to testify, the
court compared the interest of society in protecting the parent-child rela-
tionship to the state's interest in the process of fact-finding necessary to
the detection and punishment of criminal behavior.? On the one hand, the
court reasoned, it is critical that the child have the sort of relationship with
his parents that encourages him to seek their help and guidance. The court
further believed that such a relationship would be impossible if the parents
could be compelled to testify against the child.
24
On the other hand, the court recognized the great importance of the
fact-finding process.? Nevertheless, on balance, the court decided that the
state's interest in fact-finding, though a legitimate interest, was insuffi-
ciently compelling to justify a burden upon society's interest in protecting
the parent-child relationship. 8 Thus, the constitutional right to family
integrity permitted the parents to refuse to testify concerning their son's
admissions.
The court reasoned that the protection of the constitutional right to
parents in controlling the rearing of their children is constitutionally protected); Stanley v.
Illinois, 405 U.S. 645 (1972) (familial integrity is protected by the due process clause of the
fourteenth amendment and by the ninth amendment); Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158
(1944); Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510 (1925); Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390
(1923).
21 See Cleveland Bd. of Educ. v. LaFleur, 414 U.S. 632 (1974); Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S.
113 (1973); Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965).
2 People v. Doe, 61 App.Div.2d 426, 433, 403 N.Y.S.2d 375, 380 (1978); cf. United States
v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683, 710 (1974) (state's interest in fact-finding process justifies imposition
upon presidential confidentiality); Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973) (state can protect right
to life even though it invades privacy of a woman in deciding whether to have abortion);
Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665, 688 (1972) (state's interest in fact-finding process justifies
imposition of a burden upon the freedom of the press); Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S.
158, 165-67 (1944) (state may protect children even if protection involves infringement of
parents' right to control their children).
1 61 App.Div.2d at 432-34, 403 N.Y.S.2d at 380.
24 Id. The erosion of the family would lead to maladjusted, irresponsible young adults
with little sense of self-esteem or self-worth. Id. The family is largely responsible for the
socialization of the child, for his adaptation and development as a member of society. T.
GORDON, PARENT EFrscnvNF.ss TRAwmNG, passim (1975); Joselyn, Adolescence, & Lidy, The
Family: The Developmental Setting, in AMERICAN HANDBOOK OF PSYCHIATRY (Arieti ed. 1974).
Statistical studies have related such social problems as delinquency, crime, suicide, mental
illness and unwed mothers to failing families. Furlong, Youthful Marriage and Parenthood:
A Threat to Family Stability, 19 HAST. L. J. 105, 115 (1967); see Bridgmen, The Lawyer and
the Marriage Counselor Pari Passu - Partners in More Effective Service to Ailing Marriages,
4 KAN. L. REv. 546, 548 (1956). The failure of families with all the related problems would be
caused by forcing parents to disclose the child's confidential communications. 61 App.Div.2d
at 433, 403 N.Y.S.2d at 380; accord, Coburn, supra note 4, at 615-20.
2 61 App.Div.2d at 435, 403 N.Y.S.2d at 380.
26 Id.
1979]
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familial integrity, however, did not justify quashing the subpoena. 27 The
court held that the parents were not allowed to claim the privilege of
refusing to testify to certain matters until they appeared before the grand
jury.2 The subpoena could not be quashed but the parents could refuse to
disclose their son's statements when the grand jury asked about them.2
The court reasoned that there is no invasion of privacy in simply requiring
the parents to appear and that the grand jury's necessarily broad powers
would be unjustifiably compromised if subpoenas could be quashed with-
out appearing. 0 Therefore, the court reversed the trial court's decision and
remanded the case. It directed the trial court to deny the parents' motion
to quash the subpoena.
3 '
The right to family integrity, or to privacy within the family, is not
explicitly mentioned in the Constitution. 32 The right of familial privacy
results from the protection of family relationships and the protection of
personal privacy in one's associations.? Judicial determinations of the ex-
istence of the right of privacy within the family have been based on the
fourth, 34 fifth, 3  ninth3  and fourteenth amendments, 3 and on a
27 Id. at 435-36, 403 N.Y.S.2d at 381-82.
1 Id. "A testimonial privilege'. . . does not embrace a privilege against being required
to claim the privilege."' Id. at 435, 403 N.Y.S.2d at 382, citing Matter of Cunningham v.
Nadjari, 39 N.Y.2d 314, 318, 383 N.Y.S.2d 590, 591 (1976).
29 61 App.Div.2d at 436, 403 N.Y.S.2d at 381-82.
10 Id. Generally witnesses must appear in court to claim a privilege. When a party seeks
to apply the marital privilege, see note 11 supra, he must claim the privilege in court and
opposing counsel may call the witness to force the claim of privilege in court. Husband-Wife
Privileges, supra note 11, at 228. Once the privilege has been claimed and granted, however,
opposing counsel is generally denied the benefit of any further comment; he cannot suggest
any inferences from the claim of privilege to the jiry. Id.; see People v. Wilkes, 44 Cal.2d
679, 284 P.2d 481 (1955). Contra, Hampton v. State, 7 Okla. Crim. 291, 123 P. 571 (1912).
'1 61 App. Div. 2d at 436, 403 N.Y.S.2d at 381.
1" Carey v. Population Serv., Int'l, 431 U.S. 678, 684-85 (1977); Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S.
113, 152 (1973).
3 See text accompanying notes 18-21 supra. See also Family Integrity, supra note 5.
u United States v. United States District Court, 407 U.S. 297, 315-318 (1972) (domestic
security cannot be used to justify wiretapping without a warrant); Katz v. United States, 389
U.S. 347, 356 (1967) (the right of privacy exists where there is a reasonable expectation of
privacy); Johnson v. United States, 333 U.S. 10, 13 (1948) (the right of privacy in the home
can be violated only on the strength of a warrant issued by a judicial officer); Weeks v. United
States, 232 U.S. 383, 391-92 (1914) (evidence obtained in an unreasonable search and seizure
is inadmissible at trial).
U See, e.g., Lefkowitz v. Turley, 414 U.S. 70, 77-79 (1973) (one cannot be penalized for
claiming his fifth amendment rights); Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757, 767 (1966) (an
accused cannot be compelled to produce his private papers if they are incriminatory); Mi-
randa v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 458-60 (1966) (a suspect must be informed of his Constitu-
tional rights and must voluntarily waive those rights in order to be questioned).
:1 See, e.g., RoQ v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 152-53 (1973) (a woman's right to privacy extends
to the decision whether to have an abortion); Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 487
(1965) (Goldberg, J., concurring) (the right to privacy implicit in the ninth amendment
protects the decision to use contraceptives).
" See, e.g., Carey v. Population Serv., Int'l, 431 U.S. 678, 684 (1977) (a woman's right
to privacy extends to the decision whether to have an abortion); Moore v. City of E. Cleve-
land, 431 U.S. 494, 500-04 (1977) (protecting the freedom of family association).
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"penumbra" of the Bill of Rights." Judicial protection of the integrity of
the family began with Meyer v. Nebraska39 and Pierce v. Society of
Sisters.45 In Meyer, the United States Supreme Court held that a state may
not restrict the spectrum of available knowledge by prohibiting the teach-
ing of certain academic subjects.4 In Pierce, the Court held that the State
may not require parents to send their children to public rather than par-
ochial schools.4 2 Each case protects the right of parents to control their
children.
4 3
The Meyer and Pierce cases are illustrative of judicial protection of the
family attributable to the positive influence of the family in society. The
holdings in those cases were based on the concept of ordered liberty as
protected by the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment.44 Par-
ents are accorded both the right and the duty to direct the upbringing and
education of their children.45 This right was also recognized in Prince v.
Massachusetts.4" In Prince, a state statute prohibiting children from selling
or distributing literature on public streets was challenged by a guardian
who accompanied her child while the two sold religious pamphlets on city
streets." The Supreme Court noted that parents have the right to use
considerable discretion in raising their children," but held that the state's
interest in protecting children from the evik effects of child employment
on public streets was sufficient to uphold the statute.49
See, e.g., Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 483 (1965) (the Bill of Rights as a
whole creates zones of privacy, one of which protects the decision to use contraceptives).
262 U.S. 390 (1923).
'o 268 U.S. 510 (1925).
" 262 U.S. 390, 393-94 (1923). An Oklahoma statute prohibited the teaching of the
German language prior to the eighth grade. Id. at 397. The purpose of the state law was to
assure that the children of German immigrants in the state would regard English as their
native tongue. Id. at 398. It was asserted by the state that this would assure that they
developed the traditional Anglo-American values. Id.
"2 268 U.S. 510, 534-35 (1925). An Oregon statute required parents to send their children
to public schools. Id. at 530-31. The Court stated that "[the child is not the mere creature
of the State; those who nurture him and direct his destiny have the right, coupled with the
high duty, to recognize and prepare him for additional obligations." Id. at 535.
13 Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645, 651 (1972); Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158,
166 (1944).
U Pierce v. Soceity of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510, 534-35 (1925); Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S.
390, 399 (1923). Liberty, as protected by the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment,
"denotes not merely freedom from bodily restraint but also the right of the individual to
contract, to engage in any of the common occupations of life, to acquire useful knowledge, to
marry, establish a home, and bring up children." Id.
1 262 U.S. at 400; Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510, 534-35 (1925).
" 321 U.S. 158 (1944).
' Id. at 159-60. The Massachusetts statutes challenged in Prince also made it a misde-
meanor to furnish a child with any literature to be sold or distributed in any street or public
place. Id. at 160-61. Prince also involved a claim based on the freedom of religion. The claim
arose when a parent and child, who were Jehovah's Witnesses, claimed that it was their moral
duty to spread the faith of Jehovah's Witnesses by distributing pamphlets. Id. at 164.
I d. at 168.
I' d. at 170. "[Tihe state has a wide range of power for limiting parental freedom and
authority in things affecting the child's welfare. . . ." Id. at 167.
1979]
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The other source of constitutional protection of family integrity is the
right of personal privacy enunciated in Griswold v. Connecticut.0 In
Griswold, the Supreme Court held that the guarantees of the Bill of Rights
have penumbras which create certain zones of privacy." Thus, a state
statute prohibiting use of contraceptives was held invalid as an impermis-
sible imposition upon the right of privacy. 2 Since Griswold, the Court has
held that personal decisions relating to marriage,5 3 procreation,54 contra-
ception,O and abortion" are constitutionally protected.
The parental right to freedom in rearing a child, recognized by Meyer
and Pierce, together with the right of privacy established by Griswold,
have created a fairly broad right to familial autonomy. 57 The scope of the
right is uncertain, but the Doe court's extension of it to protect confidential
parent-child communications was not unwarranted. 58 The Supreme Court
held in Moore v. City of East Cleveland" that a municipality could not
regulate family associations."0 A municipal ordinance only permitted fami-
381 U.S. 479 (1965).
" Id. at 484.
Id. at 485-86. The concurring opinion of Mr. Justice Goldberg bases the right of privacy
on the ninth amendment. Id. at 492-93. He noted that the history of the ninth amendment
indicates that the "liberty" protected by the fifth and fourteenth amendments is not limited
in scope to those specific guarantees in the first eight amendments. Id. He wrote that the
Court must look to the traditions and the collective conscience of the country to determine
what rights are so fundamental as to be included in the concept of ordered liberty. "The
inquiry if whether a right involved is of such a character that it cannot be denied without
violating those 'fundamental principles of liberty and justice which lie at the base of all our
civil and political institutions."' Id. at 493.
See, e.g., Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 112 (1967) (state cannot prohibit miscegenation).
54 See, e.g., Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535, 541 (1942) (state cannot require steriliza-
tion of habitual criminals).
I See, e.g., Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438, 453 (1972) (individual has right to decide
whether to use contraceptives); Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S.479, 485 (1965).
See, e.g., Carey v. Population Serv., Int'l, 431 U.S. 678, 684-85 (1977) (there are certain
zones of privacy, including decision whether to have an abortion, which state cannot enter);
Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 152-53 (1973) (state can only limit woman's decision to have
abortion during her third trimester).
" See, e.g., Moore v. City of E. Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494, 500-04 (1977) (invalidating
municipal ordinance which disallowed certain forms of family associations within single
household); Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645, 651 (1972) (invalidating state statute which
declared children of unwed fathers to be wards of court automatically upon death of their
mother).
I' One indication of the uncertainty and breadth of the scope of the right to family
integrity is the Supreme Court's language in Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973): "[Oinly
personal rights that can be deemed 'fundamental' or 'implicit in the concept of ordered
liberty,' . . . are included in this guarantee of personal privacy. [It is also] clear that the
right has some extension to activities relating to marriage, . . . procreation, . . . contracep-
tion, . . . family relationships, . . . and child-rearing and education." Id. at 152-55. See
Family Integrity, sapra note 5.
431 U.S. 494 (1977).
Id. at 505-06. The Court reached a 4-1-4 plurality decision. The disagreement, how-
ever, was on the issue of whether the ordinance unreasonably interfered with the right of
familial privacy, whether it was rationally related to its avowed purpose, rather than on the
issue of whether the right to familial privacy exists. Id.
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lies to live together in single unit dwellings, and defined "family" as only
the nuclear family." A grandmother was prosecuted and fined because she
had two of her grandchildren, each from different parents, living with her.
2
The municipal ordinance, the Court reasoned, denied the right of familial
autonomy in directing the rearing of the child and abridged the freedom
of personal choice in matters of family life. 3 The freedoms protected in
East Cleveland are consistent with the Doe court's holding that the right
of familial privacy protected confidential communications between parent
and child." The Doe court's reasoning in finding a constitutional protec-
tion of the family was sound.
The Doe court recognized that it is also necessary to examine the inter-
est of the state in abridging that constitutional right." The Supreme Court
has repeatedly observed that constitutional rights may be infringed if the
state interest is compelling and if the law that infringes upon the right
bears a rational relationship to the interest without being so broad as to
unnecessarily infringe the right involved.6 The Supreme Court has specifi-
cally acknowledged that such a state interest may allow an imposition
upon the right to familial integrity. In Prince v. Massachusetts,"5 the
Court held that the state's interest in protecting children is sufficiently
compelling." In Roe v. Wade,70 the Court held that a state had a suffi-
ciently compelling interest in protecting the life of a viable fetus to prohibit
abortions during the third trimester.71 Both of these statutes involved sig-
nificant intrusions into the recognized domain of the family, and both were
upheld.
Intrusions into the constitutionally recognized domain of the family
may be justified by state laws which serve compelling state interests. The
Doe case presents the issue of whether the state's interest in fact-finding
is sufficiently compelling to justify abridging the privacy of parent-child
communications.72 The Doe court conceded that the state has a legitimate
interest in the fact-finding process which allows for the detection and
punishment of criminal behavior. 3 Nevertheless, the court reasoned that
the parent-child relationship is of such value to society that the state's
interest in fact-finding was subordinate to protection of the family.74
" Id. at 495-96.
,z Id. at 496-98.
' Id. at 499-503.
' People v. Doe, 61 App. Div. 2d 426, 433-34, 403 N.Y.S.2d 375, 379 (1978).
'. Id. at 433, 403 N.Y.S.2d at 380.
See, e.g., Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 152-54 (1973); Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665,
680-81 (1972); Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158, 166 (1944).
'" See, e.g., Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 152-54 (1973); Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S.
158, 166 (1944).
- 321 U.S 158, 166 (1944).
Id. at 167.
7' 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
71 Id. at 152-54.




230 WASHINGTON AND LEE LAW REVIEW
In Branzburg v. Hayes," the United States Supreme Court has consid-
ered the state's interest in the fact-finding process and has balanced that
interest against constitutional rights. In Branzburg, the issue presented
was whether the first amendment's protection of freedom of the press gave
newsmen the right to refuse to disclose the identity of their news sources
to a grand jury." The Court recognized that the failure to protect news-
men's sources would burden the collection of news and, thereby, the free-
dom of the press." The Court nevertheless held that the state's interest in
finding facts to promote fair and effective law enforcement, particularly
the importance of the grand jury, is sufficiently compelling to justify the
burden on the press.78 The prevailing view, according to the Branzburg
Court, is that the first amendment interest asserted by the newsmen is
outweighed by the general obligations of a citizen to appear before the
grand jury and to give his testimony. 9 The Court held that such a view is
consistent with Constitutional law.
In discussing the importance of the fact-finding process, the Branzburg
Court emphasized the historical importance of the grand jury and the fact
that grand jury proceedings are constitutionally mandated.85 The Court
dismissed the newsmen's claim that the infringement of their first amend-
ment right was broader than necessary to achieve the state's purpose, and
therefore invalid, by noting that the investigatory powers of the grand jury
must be broad in order for it to perform its proper function in society."
In United States v. Nixon,8" the Supreme Court again considered the
importance of the fact-finding process vis-a-vis a constitutional right. In
that case, the President asserted a privilege for all confidential presidential
communications.83 The Court held that the President's confidential corn-
73 408 U.S. 665 (1972).
11 Id. at 679-80. The Supreme Court consolidated three cases that presented that issue:
Branzburg v. Pound, 461 S.W.2d 345 (Ky. 1971) (unreported judgment of the Kentucky Court
of Appeals); In re Pappas, 358 Mass. 604, 266 N.E.2d 297 (1971); and United States v.
Caldwell, 434 F.2d 1081 (9th Cir. 1970).
408 U.S. at 690-91 (1972).
79 Id.
"' Id. at 687, citing Hannah v. Larche, 363 U.S. 420, 489-90 (1960) (Frankfurter, J.,
concurring); see United States v. Bryan, 339 U.S. 323 (1950); Blackmer v. United States, 284
U.S. 421 (1932).
" 408 U.S. at 687. The fifth amendment provides that "[n]o person shall be held to
answer for a capital, or otherwise infamous crime, unless on a presentment or indictment of
a Grand Jury." U.S. CONST., amend. V. The Court has said of the grand jury that 'its
constitutional perogatives are rooted in long centuries of Anglo-American history." Hannah
v. Larche, 363 U.S. 420, 489-90 (1960) (Frankfurter, J., concurring). It has also been said that
the inclusion of the grand jury "in our Constitution as the sole method of preferring charges
in serious criminal cases shows the high place that it holds as an instrument of justice."
Costello v. United States, 350 U.S. 359, 362 (1956).
1, 408 U.S. at 688. "Because its task is to inquire into the existence of possible criminal
conduct and to return only well-founded indictments, its investigative powers are necessarily
broad." Id.
418 U.S. 683 (1974).
Id. at 703. President Nixon made two substantive claims in addition to raising some
procedural objections to a third-party subpoena duces tecum issued by the United States
[Vol. XXXVI
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munications are constitutionally protected only insofar as they relate to
the effective discharge of his duties.' The result of the Court's holding is
that if a president claims a privilege for confidential communications in
response to a subpoena, the court must treat the subpoenaed material as
presumptively privileged.u However, if the prosecutor in a criminal case
can show that the material is essential to the prosecution, then the import-
ance of the fact-finding process, together with considerations of due pro-
cess, require the president to submit the materials for an in camera exami-
nation by the judge."'
In discussing the importance of the state's interest in the fact-finding
process, the Nixon Court emphasized the need for all relevant facts in an
adversary system of justice. The Court cited the maxim that the public has
a right to every man's evidence'7 and suggested that exceptions to that
maxim should be narrowly drawn." The judicial system is designed to
assure that the guilty are punished and that the innocent do not suffer.
To that end, the Court said, full disclosure of all relevant facts is essen-
tial."5
The importance attributed to the fact-finding process by the Supreme
Court casts doubt upon the propriety of the Doe court's decision. In
Branzburg, the Supreme Court held that the state's interest in the fact-
finding process of the grand jury is sufficiently compelling to justify an
abridgment of the fundamental right of freedom of the press, explicitly
District Court for the District of Columbia. Id. at 686. His first claim was that the courts were
precluded from reviewing his claim of privilege by the doctrine of the separation of powers.
Had this claim prevailed, the President would have been granted an absolute privilege of
confidentiality for all presidential communications. Id. at 703. The President asserted that
there is a valid need for confidentiality of communications between high government officials
and that the independence of the executive branch protects the president, and therefore his
confidential communications, from a subpoena in an ongoing prosecution. Id. at 705-06. The
Court conceded the need for confidentiality but said, "The impediment that an absolute,
unqualified privilege would place in the way of the primary constitutional duty of the Judicial
Branch to do justice in criminal prosecutions would plainly conflict with the function of the
courts under Art. i." Id. at 707.
The second claim of the President was that, in the absence of an absolute privilege for
confidential presidential communications, Article II of the Constitution should require that
his claim of privilege should prevail over the subpoena duces tecum. Id. at 703. In considering
this second claim the Court balanced the importance of the fact-finding process against a
Constitutional provision. The President asserted that without a privilege for confidential
presidential communications, he could not fully and effectively perform the duties required
of him by Article II of the Constitution. Id. at 708.
'Id.
Id. The notion that presidential communications which the president claims are privi-
leged are to be regarded as "presumptively privileged," stems from the language of the
opinion in Nixon v. Sirica, 487 F.2d 700, 713 (D.C. Cir. 1973). On appeal, both parties
accepted the notion as controlling.
u Id. at 713-14.
9 Id. at 709.
u Id. at 710: "Whatever their origins, ... exceptions to the demand for every man's
evidence are not lightly created not expansively construed, for they are in derogation of the
search for truth."
u Id. at 710.
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protected by the first amendment. 0 Yet the Doe court held that the same
interest is insufficiently compelling to warrant an abridgment of the right
to family integrity,9' a right not specifically mentioned in the Constitu-
tion.2 In Nixon, the Supreme Court held that the need for all the relevant
facts in a criminal prosecution overcomes the Constitutional protection of
the confidentiality of presidential communications implicit in article HI.13
But the Doe court held that the same need in a grand jury's investigation
of criminal behavior cannot overcome constitutional protection of the fam-
ily.94 The Doe court's evaluation of the importance of the fact-finding
process, as compared to the importance of constitutional rights, is incon-
sistent with the Supreme Court's judgments on that issue.
Whether or not the Doe court's view of the importance of the fact-
finding process is consistent with the United States Supreme Court's view,
it is undeniable that family integrity and the parent-child relationship are
valuable to society and worthy of protection. 5 The alternative to protect-
ing a relationship by way of constitutional right is to enact a statute creat-
ing a testimonial privilege protecting the confidential communications
within that relationship." The Supreme Court recognized this possibility
in Branzburg and suggested that the ability to legislate as broadly or as
narrowly as desired, and, if necessary, to revise the statute periodically,
made this alternative preferable to the extension of constitutional protec-
tion which compromises the fact-finding process. 7 The Doe court also
recognized the possibility of a statutory privilege but noted that the crea-
tion of such a privilege was strictly within the province of the state legisla-
ture. "
A testimonial privilege protects confidential communications from
compelled disclosure. The purpose of a privilege is to insure the satisfac-
tory maintenance of relationships in which confidentiality is essential. 9
Implicit in the recognition of a privilege is a societal preference valuing
the protected relationship more highly than the state's interest in the fact-
0 Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665, 690 (1912); see text accompanying notes 76-82
supra.
" People v. Doe, 61 App.Div.2d 426, 433-34, 403 N.Y.S.2d 375, 380 (1978); see text
accompanying notes 25-26 & 73-75 supra.
*2 See note 32 supra.
'* United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683, 713-14 (1974); see text accompanying notes 83-
90 supra.
' 61 App.Div.2d at 433-34, 403 N.Y.S.2d at 380.
,5 See text accompanying note 24 supra.
, See, e.g., Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S 665, 706 (1972).
,7 Id.
11 "Wie believe that the creation of privilege devolves exclusively on the Legislature."
App.Div.2d at 434, 403 N.Y.S.2d at 381 The Doe court's belief is supported by the fact that
nearly all testimonial privileges are statutorily created. See note 103 infra.
" WIGMORE, supra note 1, at § 2285; Husband-Wife Privileges, supra note 11, at 211-14.
0 WIGMORE, supra note 1, at § 2285; Moser, supra note 11, at 17-18; Sterk, Testimonial
Privileges: An Analysis of Horizontal Choice of Law Problems, 61 MINN. L. Rav. 461, 467
(1977) [hereinafter cited as Sterk]; Husband- Wife Privileges, supra 11, at 218-19.
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finding process.101 Privileges are generally created by statute. 2 Recently,
new privileges have been suggested and adopted in some states,0 3 although
101 WIGMORE, supra note 1, at § 2285. Most rules of evidence exclude evidence on the basis
of its lack of reliability. Privileges, however, deliberately exclude evidence which is considered
to be highly reliable in order to protect a given relationship. Thus, to protect the relationship,
the fact-finding process is compromised. In United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683 (1974), the
Court said any exceptions to the rule requiring all citizens to give their evidence should not
be lightly created or broadly construed, "for they are in derogation of the search for truth."
Id. at 711; see Manley, Patient, Penitent, Client and Spouse in New York, 21 N.Y.S.B.A.
BuLL. 288 (1940); Spousal Testimony, supra note 11, at 260 n.2.
't Fifty-four American jurisdictions (including the District of Columbia, Puerto Rico,
the Virgin Islands, the fifty states and the federal system) recognize the marital confidential-
ity privilege. Only six states (Alabama, Connecticut, Delaware, Florida, Maine and Missis-
sippi) have no statutory basis for the privilege. Spousal Testimony, supra, note 11, at 293-
96. At early common law, the courts would periodically allow a "gentleman" to refuse to
testify when his honor would be compromised by revealing a confidence. Layer's Trial, 16
How. St. Tr. 93 (1772); Lord Grey's Trial, 9 How. St. Tr. 127 (1682); Bulstrod v. Letchmere,
Freem. Ch. 5 (1676). Since 1776, however, a primary rule of evidence has been that the state
is entitled to every man's evidence, unless some exception allows him to refuse to testify.
United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683, 710 (1974); Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665, 688
(1972); United States v. Bryan, 339 U.S. 323, (1950); Blackmer v. United States, 284 U.S.
421, 438 (1932); The Dutchess of Kingston's Case, 20 How. St. Tr. 586 (1776). See also
WIGMORE, supra note 1, at § 2286 n.16, § 2192; text accompanying notes 1-3 supra. The
general rule is that there is not privilege in the absence of a statute. Stiles v. Clifton Springs
Sanitarium Co., 74 F. Supp. 907, 908 (W.D.N.Y. 1947); Thomas v. Morris, 286 N.Y. 266, 36
N.E.2d 141 (1941); Application of Heller, 184 Misc. 75, 53 N.Y.S.2d 86 (1945).
03' Eighteen states now have privileges which allow an investigative reporter to refuse to
reveal the source of his information. See, e.g., ALA. CODE § 12-21-142 (1975); CAL. Evm. CODE
§ 1070 (West Supp.; 1974); N. M. STAT. ANN. § 20-1-12.1 (Supp. 1975); N.Y. CIv. RIGHTS LAW
§ 79h(b) (McKinney Supp. 1970). Only Michigan, New Mexico, and New York protect the
substance as well as the source of the journalist's information. Note, Newsman-Source Privi-
lege: A Foundation in Policy for Recognition at Common Law, 26 U. FLA. L. Rav. 453, 463
(1974) [hereinafter cited as Newsman-Source]. In Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665, 690-91
(1972), the Supreme Court held that the first amendment does not protect journalists from
disclosing information as to sources or substance to grand juries. Eight state legislatures have
considered privilege statutes since the Branzburg decision. See Fla. H. R. 3794 (2d Reg. Sess.
1972); Mass. S. 114 (Reg. Sess. 1972); Minn. S. 945 (Reg. Sess. 1971); Mo. H.R. 18 (Reg. Seas.
1971); Neb. Leg. 1179, 1371 (Reg. Sess. 1972); Tex. H.R. 205 (Reg. Sess. 1972); Tex. S. 558
(1972); Wis. S. 585 (Reg. Seass. 1971). Many commentators have supported the creation of
journalist-source privilege. See, e.g., Note, Constitutional Protection for the Newsman's
Work Product, 6 HARv. C.R.-C.L. L. REv. 617 (1971); Note, Judicial Relief for the Newsman's
Plight: A Time for Secrecy, 45 ST. JoHN's L. REv. 484 (1971); Newsman-Source supra, at 473.
Contra, Carter, The Journalist, His Informant and Testimonial Privilege, 35 N.Y.U. L. REv.
1111 (1960).
Sixteen states have statutes creating an accountant-client privilege. See, e.g., Am. Rv.
STAT. § 32-749 (West 1976); MicH. COMP. LAws § 338. 3120 (Supp. 1978); TENN. CODE ANN. §
62-143 (1976). While there is no constitutional basis for an accountant-client privilege, Couch
v. United States, 409 U.S. 322, 335 (1973), many commentators urge the statutory creation
of such a privilege. See, e.g., Jentz, Accountant Privileged Communications: Is it a Dying
Concept under the New Federal Rules of Evidence?, 11 Am. Bus. L. J. 149 (1973); Saltzman,
Accountants and the IRS Summons: Recent Developments, 7 TAx AnvSOR 516 (1976).
At least thirteen states recognize a privilege for confidential communications between
school guidance counselors and their counselees. See, e.g., CONN. GN. STAT. § 10-154a (West
1977); IND. CODE § 20-6.1-6-15 (1976); MICH. COMP. LAWS § 600.2165 (West 1978). This privi-
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the general trend is away from the creation of new privileges," because
privileges deliberately exclude reliable evidence in order to protect the
relationship involved."15
There are three primary justifications for the creation of a testimonial
privilege."81 First, a privilege may be justified as a safeguard against inva-
sion of personal privacy.' 7 The need for privacy is widely recognized and
may warrant the suppression of certain evidence."8s Second, a testimonial
lege also receives support from commentators. See e.g., Robinson, Testimonial Privilege and
the School Guidance Counselor, 25 SYRAcusE L. REV. 911 (1974); Comment, An Analysis of
the 1972 South Dakota Counselor-Student Privilege Statute, 19 S. DAKOTA L. REv. 378 (1974).
Other privileges created by statute are those for communications between psychotherap-
ists and patients, see, e.g., CAL. EVID. CODE, §§ 1010-1028 (West Supp. 1977); COL. REV. STAT.
§ 13-90-107(g)(1976); IND. CODE § 25-38-1-17 (1971); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 8-53.3 (1969), and
between social workers and client. See, e.g., N.Y. Civ. PRAc. LAW. § 4508 (McKinney Supp.
1978).
101 The new privileges have been criticized for a number of years. In 1937-38, the Ameri-
can Bar Association sponsored a Committeeon the Improvement of the Law of Evidence. The
report of that committee criticized the creation of new privileges, suggesting that the demand
for these privileges stemmed from organizational self-interest. 63 A.B.A. RPoa'Ts 595 (1938).
Certain professional organizations were said to be seeking privileges in order to augment their
pride in the organization and to give its members another indication of their status as profes-
sionals. The report recommended that no legislature create any new privileges, particularly
for accountants, social workers and journalists. Id.
Both the American Law Institute's Model Code of Evidence and the Uniform Rules of
Evidence approved in 1953 by the National Conference on Uniform State Laws and the
American Bar Association exclude all of the so-called novel, or new, privileges. See MODEL
CODE OF EVIDENCE rules 209-24 (1942); UNIFORM RULES OF EVIDENCE 500-505. The new Uniform
Rules of Evidence, approved by the National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State
Laws in August, 1974, also exclude all novel privileges. See UNIFORM RULES OF EVIDENCE 501-
05 (1974).
The Supreme Court has also indicated that new privileges should not be lightly created.
United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683, 711 (1974). The Court has noted that "[the creation
of new testimonial privileges has been met with disfavor by commentators since such privi-
leges obstruct the search for truth." Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665, 690 n.29 (1972); see
McMann v. SEC, 87 F.2d 377, 378 (2d Cir. 1937). See also Z. CHAFEE, GovERNMENT AND MAss
COMMUNICATIONS 496-97 (1947); C. MCCORMICK, EVIDENCE 159 (2d ed. 1972); WIGMORE, supra
note 1, at § 2192, Morgan, Foreward to MODEL CODE OF EVIDENCE at 22-30 (1942); Chafee,
Privileged Communications: Is Justice Served or Obstructed by Closing the Doctor's Mouth
on the Witness Stand?, 52 YALE L. J. 607 (1943).
10' See note 101 supra.
Sterk, supra note 100, at 466-69.
10? Id. at 467; see Coburn, supra 4, at 602-03; Nelson, Domestic Tranquility and the Right
to Privacy: Is There a Right to Privacy within the Family?, 18 S. TEx. L. J. 121 (1976).
108 See text accompanying notes 34-38 supra. See also United States v. United States
District Court, 407 U.S. 297, 314-15 (1972) (excluding evidence obtained through a warrant-
less wiretap); Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 655 (1961) (extending the exclusionary rule to
improper state conduct); Weeks v. United States, 232 U.S. 383,398 (1914) (evidence obtained
in an unreasonable intrusion upon one's privacy is inadmissible). The fact that a testimonial
privilege might protect personal privacy does not give it Constitutional overtones, even
though the same purpose may be served by the Constitutional right to privacy. Branzburg v.
Hayes, 408 U.S. 665, 706 (1972). See generally Note, The Privilege Argument - How It Has
Fared in Constitutional Law, 40 MINN. L. REv. 486, 495 (1956); see also Horn Silver Mining
Co. v. New York, 143 U.S. 305, 315 (1892).
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privilege may be justified as a promotion of free communication within a
relationship. ' While this rationale may overlap with protecting personal
privacy, it can be distinguished from the latter in that it protects and
encourages relationships rather than individual interests. Thus, where free
communication is essential to the satisfactory maintenance of a socially
desirable relationship, a privilege from forced disclosure promotes the sort
of communication that is necessary."' Finally, a privilege may be justified
when forcing the witness to testify is naturally repugnant to society's sensi-
bilities."'
Based on the policies underlying the existing testimonial privileges,
112
'" WIGMORE, supra note 1, at § 2285; Moser, supra note 11, at 17-18; Husband-Wife
Privileges, supra note 11, at 218-19.
"' WIGMORE, supra note 1, at § 2285; Sterk, supra note 100, at 469. A striking example
of the need for a privilege to promote free communication is the privilege for psychotherapist-
patient communications. Coburn, supra note 4, at 618-21; Slovenko, Psychiatry and a Second
Look at the Medical Privilege, 6 WAYNE L. Rav. 175, 184 (1960). A psychotherapeutic relation-
ship is one in which a party feels free to discuss his problems openly without fear that his
confidence will be betrayed. Coburn, supra note 4, at 618. Such a relationship is generally
considered to be impossible where there is a constraint on free communication, such as the
possibility that disclosure will be compelled in court. Id. at 618-21; accord, Fisher, The
Psychotherapeutic Professions and the Law of Privileged Communications, 10 WAYNE L. Rv.
609, 616-20 (1964) [hereinafter cited as Fisher]; Ketcham, Legal Renaissance in the Juvenile
Court, 60 Nw. U. L. REV. 585, 593-95 (1965); Louisell, The Psychologist in Today's Legal
World: Part H, 41 MINN. L. Rav. 731, 750 (1957); Rosenheim, Privilege, Confidentiality, and
Juvenile Offenders, 11 WAYNE L. REV. 660, 663 (1965); Slovenko, Psychotherapy and
Confidentiality, 24 CLEVE. ST. L. REV. 375, 376 (1975).
"I Sterk, supra note 100, at 469; Fisher, supra note 110, at 623-25; see Mullen v. United
States, 263 F.2d 275, 281 (D.C. Cir. 1958) (confidential communications from a penitent to
priest should be privileged because forced disclosure would be "shocking to the moral sense
of the community").
112 There are four testimonial privileges which have been widely recognized. The first is
the attorney-client privilege. WIGMoaE, supra note 1, at §§ 2290-2329. For many years it has
been recognized that effective counsel is essential to fair litigation and that such counsel is
impossible absent complete confidentiality within the attorney-client relationship. Id. at 99
2285, 2291; Sterk, supra note 101, at 467-69. See also Colton v. United States, 306 F.2d 633
(2d Cir. 1962); Wade v. Ridley, 87 Me. 368, 373, 32 A. 975, 976 (1895); Greenough v.Gaskell,
1 Myl. & K. 98, 103, 39 Eng. Rep. 618, 620 (Ch. 1833). The attorney-client privilege may be
justified, therefore, as a protection of free communication where such communication is
essential to a socially desirable relationship. See MODEL CODE OF EVIDENcE, rule 210, Com-
ment (1942). See generally Note, The Lawyer-Client Privilege: Its Application to Corpora-
tions, the Role of Ethics, and Its Possible Curtailment, 56 Nw. U. L. Rav. 235, 236 (1961).
The second of the existing privileges is the doctor-patient privilege. There was no privi-
lege it common law for surgeons or doctors, Wxwmom, supra note 1, at § 2380, however, the
privilege is a creature of statute in most states. See, e.g., MICH. CoMP. LAws § 600.2157
(1968); OR. Rsv. STAT. § 44.040(1)(d) (1953). Though Wigmore criticizes the privilege, see
WmMORE, supra note 1, at 2380a, many commentators support its continued observance and
its extension to psychotherapists. E.g., Coburn, supra note 4, at 618-21; Fisher, supra note
110, at 620-37. See also note 111 supra.
The third of the major privileges is the priest-penitent privilege. Wigmore, supra note 1,
at § 2394. This privilege protects confidential communications from a penitent to his priest
provided the priest is acting in his official capacity. Id. There is little justification for this
privilege other than the natural repugnance of forcing a priest to disclose the confidences of
his penitent. It is generally agreed, however, that removal of the privilege would be of little
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Wigmore formulated a test for the creation of a privilege"3 which has been
widely accepted. " ' The test, cited by the Doe court, sets forth four condi-
tions which suggest when application of, or creation of, a testimonial privi-
lege is appropriate."' First, the communications which are sought to be
characterized as privileged must have originated in confidence that they
would not be disclosed." 6 Clearly there are communications from child to
parent which are intended to be confidential. 7 Where the facts of the case
indicate that the communication in question was not intended to be confi-
dential, they should not be privileged. "8
Second, Wigmore's test requires that confidentiality be essential to the
full and satisfactory maintenance of the relationship."' There seems to be
a consensus that confidentiality is absolutely essential to the parent-child
relationship. 2 ' The basis for the consensus on this point is the belief that
communication is essential to the relationship .and that such communica-
tion is stifled by a lack of confidentiality.'"' When a child's confidences are
revealed, further communication between the parent and child is stifled
and the family is unable to perform the function which society expects of
it.
Third, Wigmore's test requires that the relationship be one which so-
ciety feels is worthy of protection.'22 Society seeks to protect the parent-
child relationship in order to minimize such social problems as delin-
help to the fact-finding process. Coburn, supra note 4, at 609.
The fourth of the major privileges is the privilege for marital communications. See note
11 supra. The marital privilege must be distinguished from common law incompetency and
from the anti-marital fact privilege. At common law, one spouse was incompetent to testify
for or against the other spouse. This rule was based on the belief that a party is not a reliable
witness in his own case and on the general acceptance of the notion that a man and his wife
were one. Husband-Wife Privileges, supra note 11, 208-09. Only Pennsylvania retains the
imcompetency doctrine entirely though traces of it remain in other states as well. Spousal
Testimony, supra note 11, at 293-96.
The anti-marital fact doctrine began to develop as the incompetency doctrine gradually
disappeared. Husband-Wife Privileges, supra note 11, at 209-10. This doctrine gave a party-
spouse the right to prevent testimony against him by the witness-spouse in order to protect
the marital relationship and to prevent perjury. Id.; see WIGMORE, supra note 1, at § 2228.
Some states retain the privilege for anti-marital facts, though it is distinct from the privilege
for confidential communications. See, e.g., CAL. EVID. CODE § 970 (West Supp. 1966).
The privilege for confidential marital communications protects the marital relationship,
Hawkins v. United States, 358 U.S. 74, 77 (1958); Moser, supra note 11, and applies in all
American jurisdictions. Spousal Testimony, supra note 11, at 293-96.
" WIGMORE, supra note 1, at § 2285.
"1 See, e.g., Falsone v. United States, 205 F.2d 734, 740 (5th Cir. 1953); United States
v. Funk, 84 F. Supp. 967, 969 (E.D. Ky. 1949); Morris v. Avallone, 272 A.2d 344, 347 (Del.
Super. 1970).
"5 WIGMORE, supra note 1, at § 2285.
11 Id.
"1 Coburn, supra note 4, at 623.
"' See note 11 supra.
"' WIGMORE, supra note 1, at § 2285.
12* See note 24 supra.
121 Id.
'n WIGMORE, supra note 1, at § 2285.
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quency, crime, suicide and mental illness, all of which have been related
to failing families."' To decrease the incidence of these problems, society
feels the family should be fostered and protected. This is revealed by the
fact that the family is afforded some constitutional protection. 4
Finally, the Wigmore test requires that forced disclosure must be more
destructive than constructive; it must hurt the relationship more than it
helps further society's interest in criminal justice."' The Doe court pointed
out the harm that would inure to the family by compelling parents to
disclose their child's admissions.' 6 Though the Supreme Court likely
would deny that a parent-child privilege meets this requirement,", the
Court has specifically left open the possibility of a statutory privilege cre-
ated either by federal or by a state legislature.' 8 It seems clear that
whether the privilege meets this final requirement is a question best re-
solved by legislative bodies.
A comparison of the parent-child privilege under consideration to the
existing marital privilege supports the conclusion that the creation of the
new privilege would be justified.'' The marital privilege is the result of an
effort to protect the marital relationship, a relationship which society feels
ought to be fostered.'3' The privilege is based on the belief that without free
communication and confidentiality, a marriage cannot perform its social
functions."' Thus, the marital privilege protects all confidential communi-
cations made during the marriage, even after divorce or death of one of the
spouses."'
There are some exceptions to the marital privilege derived from the
common law "necessity exception.""' The exceptions vary from state to
state but all involve situations where the marital relationship has deterio-
rated to a point at which it is no longer worthy of protection.'34 Many states
have preserved the common law exception that the marital privilege does
not apply where one spouse is tried for an assault upon the other.' In such
" See note 24 supra.
'" See text accompanying notes 32-38 supra.
.,. WGMORE, supra note 1, at § 2285.
22 People v. Doe, 61 App.Div.2d 426, 432-33, 403 N.Y.S.2d 375, 380 (1978).
" See text accompanying notes 90-94 supra.
" Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665, 706 (1972).
' The marital privilege is the most closely related to the proposed parent-child privilege.
The other existing privileges involve communications made to one in his professional capac-
ity. WIGMORE, supra note 1, at §§ 2300-04, 2382-83, 2394-96; see note 112 supra.
230 See notes 11 & 112 supra.
'13 Id.; see Hawkins v. United States, 358 U.S. 74, 77 (1958); Louisell, Confidentiality,
Conformity and Confusion: Privileges in Federal Court Today, 31 TuL. L. REv. 101, 113
(1956).
232 See notes 11 & 112 supra.
' WIGMORE, supra note 1, at § 2239; Hutchins & Slesinger, supra note 1, at 676-77.
'' Twenty-seven states deny the application of the marital privilege in cases involving
non-support or desertion. Spousal Testimony, supra note 11, at 293-96. Seventeen disallow
the privilege in cases involving abandonment. Id. Sixteen states deny it in cases involving
crimes againdt the other spouse or their children. Id. Thirteen states refuse'the privilege in
cases involving a civil action by one spouse against the other. Id.
' Id.
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a trial, civil or criminal, the value of the familial relationship to society
has decreased to the point that it is subordinate to society's interest in
finding the facts and in protecting past and potential victims.
Confidentiality would seem to be as essential to the parent-child rela-
tionship as it is to the husband-wife relationship.'36 Moreover, both rela-
tionships are ones which society feels ought to be sedulously fostered.' It
is clear that a communication between a parent and child is as likely to
be confidential as a communication between husband and wife.', Finally,
every American jurisdiction and many foreign jurisdictions have decided
that the harm that would be caused to the marital relationship by compel-
ling disclosure of confidential communications within that relationship
outweighs the benefit of disclosure to the judicial process.139 It would seem
reasonable to assert that this value judgment is equally true of the parent-
child relationship and that the statutory creation of a privilege for confi-
dential parent-child communications is therefore justifiable.
In analyzing the decision of the New York Supreme Court in People v.
Doe, one must look both at the court's assertion that the parent-child
relationship is constitutionally protected and at the court's finding that
the state's interest in the fact-finding process is not sufficiently compelling
to justify an abridgment of that constitutional protection. With respect to
the constitutional protection, the court's reasoning is very sound. The
United States Supreme Court has clearly established that there exists a
fundamental right to familial integrity.' That right protects the parents'
authority to direct the upbringing and education of their children' and
the individual's right of privacy in deciding whether to raise a family' and
with whom to raise a family."' A simple extension of this right of privacy
justifies protecting a child-parent communication.
Some uncertainties arise, however, with respect to the Doe court's find-
ing that the state's interest in the fact-finding process is not sufficiently
compelling to justify an infringement of familial integrity.'4 The United
States Supreme Court has had opportunities to evaluate the importance
of the grand jury and of the fact-finding process in general, and has estab-
lished that the state's interest in the search for truth is compelling.' The
Court has upheld laws which furthered that interest by requiring every
man to give his testimony even though such laws imposed upon constitu-
131 Coburn, supra note 4, at 623-25; see Committee on Psychiatry and Law,
Confidentiality and Privleged Communications in the Practice of Psychiatry, 45 GRoup FOR
THE ADVANCEMENT OF PSYCHIATY, 95 (1960); Goldberg, Social Work and Law, 7 CHIUDREN 168
(1960).
'3 See notes 24 & 112 supra.
131 Id.; see notes 11 & 108 supra.
'3' See note 112 supra
14 See text accompanying notes 32-64 supra.
" See, e.g., Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510 (1925).
142 See, e.g., Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 152-54 (1973).
, See, e.g., Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1 (1967).
'" People v. Doe, 61 App.Div.2d 425, 433-34, 403 N.Y.S.2d 375, 380 (1978).
"5 See text accompanying notes 65-89 supra.
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tionally protected rights,"' including a right specifically enumerated in the
first amendment." 7 The Doe court, however, considered the state's interest
in the fact-finding process insufficient to warrant an intrusion upon the.
right to familial integrity. The propriety of that judgment is doubtful.
The Doe court's impression of the importance of the parent-child rela-
tionship is one that is widely shared. "8 To protect that relationship and to
avoid the questionable assertion that familial integrity outweighs the
search for evidence, a statutory privilege could be drafted with appropriate
limits and exceptions. Both the Doe court and the United States Supreme
Court recognize this alternative, and the Supreme Court has found a statu-
tory privilege preferable to the recognition of a new constitutional right to
refuse to testify."'
A testimonial privilege for confidential communications between par-
ent and child meets all of the requirements of the widely accepted Wig-
more test.' It would protect confidential communications within a rela-
tionship to which confidentiality is essential, a relationship which society
deems worthy of protection from the injury that would inure to it by
compelling disclosure of the communication. The new privilege would be
logically consistent with the existing privilege for confidential communica-
tions within the marital relationship. 5 ' All that is necessary is for the state
legislatures to decide that protection of the parent-child relationship war-
rants the imposition of a burden upon the judicial system by further limit-
ing the sources of relevant facts. Unless and until the legislature makes
that decision, the Doe court's decision will remain open to question, and
the parent-child relationship may be left unprotected.
DANIEL E. WESTBROOK
"United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683 (1974).
"' Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665 (1972).
"' See note 24 supra.
'" 408 U.S. at 706.
,5 WIMonoP, supra note 1, at § 2285; see text accompanying notes 112-118 supra.
"I See text accompanying notes 119-29 supra.
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